tially, it is easy to see how perfect equilibration could occur:
exactly $d$ of $N$ players would enter, because all the later entrants
would know how many earlier players had entered. (For example,
in a subgame perfect equilibrium the firs…Gabaix, Xavier, and David Laibson, “A Boundedly Rational Decision Algorithm,” American Economic Review, XC (May 2000), 433–438.
Gabaix, Xavier, David Laibson, Guillermo Moloche, and Stephen Weinberg, “The Allocation of Attention: Theory an…[^18]: The results of Sonsino, Erev, and Gilat [2002] are even more consistent with CH, except that they report substantial betting and nonbetting rates by player IIs in states A and D (about 20 percent) which suggests that τ ≈ 1.
[^19]: T…
Daniel Kahneman
psychologist · 3 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
The Wikipedia summary and provided excerpts don't clearly establish Kahneman's role in this course material—he appears to be cited in a bibliography entry on bounded rationality and attention allocation (Excerpt 2) rather than discussed directly in the main text. His foundational work on cognitive biases and heuristics likely undergirds the course's engagement with how human decision-making deviates from rational actor models, particularly relevant to understanding behavioral responses in game-theoretic and computational contexts. If present in the full readings, Kahneman would anchor discussions of the gap between idealized AI rationality and actual human cognition in algorithmic systems.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Colin Camerer 3Brit Grosskopf 1Charles Holt 1Dale Stahl 1David Laibson 1Ernan Haruvy 1Guillermo Moloche 1Jacob Goeree 1John C. Harsanyi 1John Maynard Keynes 1Jun Zhang 1Keith Weigelt 1Reinhard Selten 1Reinhard Tietz 1Rosemarie Nagel 1Stephen Weinberg 1Teck-Hua Ho 1Thomas Palfrey 1Trey Hedden 1Wulf Albers 1Xavier Gabaix 1Anatol Rapoport 1Darryl Seale 1Ernst Fehr 1Gilat 1Ho 1Ido Erev 1Jean-Robert Tyran 1Sonsino 1Weigelt 1