In our experiments, subjects played five entry games with no feedback. If the number of entrants was above (less than or equal to) $d$, the entrants earned 0 ($1); nonentrants earned $.50. Subjects also played 22 matrix games with mixed equ…The entry and mixed-equilibrium games were run in four experimental sessions of twelve subjects each. Each game was played (with no feedback) against a random opponent in the same session and earnings accumulated. Two sessions used undergra…Gabaix, Xavier, and David Laibson, “A Boundedly Rational Decision Algorithm,” American Economic Review, XC (May 2000), 433–438.
Gabaix, Xavier, David Laibson, Guillermo Moloche, and Stephen Weinberg, “The Allocation of Attention: Theory an…
Thomas Palfrey
economist · 3 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Palfrey appears here as an experimental economist studying bounded rationality and strategic behavior in controlled laboratory settings, particularly through game theory experiments examining how subjects deviate from rational equilibrium predictions. His work provides empirical evidence that humans employ heuristic decision-making rather than perfect optimization, a critical foundation for understanding how AI systems must account for actual human behavior rather than idealized rational agents. The readings use his experimental methodology to ground discussions of how cognitive limitations shape real-world decision-making in systems involving human-AI interaction.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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Charles Holt 2Colin Camerer 2Jacob Goeree 2Brit Grosskopf 1Dale Stahl 1Daniel Kahneman 1David Laibson 1Ernan Haruvy 1Guillermo Moloche 1John C. Harsanyi 1John Maynard Keynes 1Jun Zhang 1Keith Weigelt 1Reinhard Selten 1Reinhard Tietz 1Rosemarie Nagel 1Stephen Weinberg 1Teck-Hua Ho 1Trey Hedden 1Wulf Albers 1Xavier Gabaix 1Anatol Rapoport 1Barry O'Neill 1Barry Sopher 1Benoit Proulx 1Bernard Lieberman 1David Messick 1Dilip Mookerjee 1Erich Boebel 1Fang-Fang Tang 1