Denote a $k$-step player’s belief about the proportion of $h$-step players by $gk(h)$. We assume that players doing $k \geq 1$ steps do not realize that others are using more than $k$ steps of thinking (that is, $gk(h) = 0, \forall h \geq k…Gabaix, Xavier, and David Laibson, “A Boundedly Rational Decision Algorithm,” American Economic Review, XC (May 2000), 433–438.
Gabaix, Xavier, David Laibson, Guillermo Moloche, and Stephen Weinberg, “The Allocation of Attention: Theory an…
Xavier Gabaix
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Gabaix is an economist who develops models of bounded rationality—how agents make decisions with limited cognitive resources and incomplete information about others' reasoning depth. His work with Laibson on boundedly rational algorithms and attention allocation provides the mathematical framework for understanding strategic interaction when players operate under cognitive constraints, a key concept for modeling how AI systems and human agents navigate complex environments with asymmetric information and limited computational capacity.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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