Denote a $k$-step player’s belief about the proportion of $h$-step players by $gk(h)$. We assume that players doing $k \geq 1$ steps do not realize that others are using more than $k$ steps of thinking (that is, $gk(h) = 0, \forall h \geq k…Kovalchik, Stephanie, Colin F. Camerer, David M. Grether, Charles R. Plott, and John M. Allman, “Aging and Decision Making: A Broad Comparative Study of Decision Behavior in Neurologically Healthy Elderly and Young Individuals,” Journal of …
Xavier Gabaix
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Gabaix is an economist known for modeling bounded rationality and cognitive limitations in decision-making, particularly through frameworks like "level-k thinking" where agents reason iteratively with imperfect models of others' sophistication. In the course readings, his work appears in the context of formalizing how human cognition constrains strategic behavior—agents operate under cognitive depth limits rather than perfect rationality, a concept crucial for understanding how AI systems might need to account for (or exploit) human bounded reasoning in mixed human-machine systems.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
David Laibson 2Brit Grosskopf 1Charles Holt 1Colin Camerer 1Dale Stahl 1Daniel Kahneman 1Ernan Haruvy 1Guillermo Moloche 1Jacob Goeree 1John C. Harsanyi 1John Maynard Keynes 1Jun Zhang 1Keith Weigelt 1Reinhard Selten 1Reinhard Tietz 1Rosemarie Nagel 1Stephen Weinberg 1Teck-Hua Ho 1Thomas Palfrey 1Trey Hedden 1Wulf Albers 1Ami Pazgal 1Colin Camerer and Dan Lovallo 1Ganesh Iyer 1Yuxin Chen 1