Denote a $k$-step player’s belief about the proportion of $h$-step players by $gk(h)$. We assume that players doing $k \geq 1$ steps do not realize that others are using more than $k$ steps of thinking (that is, $gk(h) = 0, \forall h \geq k…Gabaix, Xavier, and David Laibson, “A Boundedly Rational Decision Algorithm,” American Economic Review, XC (May 2000), 433–438.
Gabaix, Xavier, David Laibson, Guillermo Moloche, and Stephen Weinberg, “The Allocation of Attention: Theory an…
David Laibson
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Laibson is an economist working on bounded rationality and cognitive limitations in decision-making, appearing here through his collaborative work with Gabaix on boundedly rational algorithms and attention allocation. His framework is foundational to the course's exploration of how actual agents (human and artificial) operate under computational and cognitive constraints rather than assuming perfect rationality. The excerpts situate his thinking within formal models of limited steps of reasoning and selective attention, which bridge economic theory and the behavioral realities that AI systems must account for.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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Xavier Gabaix 2Brit Grosskopf 1Charles Holt 1Colin Camerer 1Dale Stahl 1Daniel Kahneman 1Ernan Haruvy 1Guillermo Moloche 1Jacob Goeree 1John C. Harsanyi 1John Maynard Keynes 1Jun Zhang 1Keith Weigelt 1Reinhard Selten 1Reinhard Tietz 1Rosemarie Nagel 1Stephen Weinberg 1Teck-Hua Ho 1Thomas Palfrey 1Trey Hedden 1Wulf Albers 1Ami Pazgal 1Colin Camerer and Dan Lovallo 1Ganesh Iyer 1Yuxin Chen 1