Denote another player $-i$’s strategy by $s{-i}^j$, and player $i$’s payoffs from choosing $si^j$ when the other player chooses $s{-i}^j$ by $\pii(si^j, s{-i}^j)$. Given the $k$-step thinker’s beliefs, the expected payoff to a $k$-step thin…Banks, Jeffrey, Colin F. Camerer, and David Porter, “Experimental Tests of Nash
Refinements in Signaling Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, VI (1994),
1–31.
Binmore, Kenneth, “Modeling Rational Players: Part II,” Economics and Philos-
oph…Gabaix, Xavier, and David Laibson, “A Boundedly Rational Decision Algorithm,” American Economic Review, XC (May 2000), 433–438.
Gabaix, Xavier, David Laibson, Guillermo Moloche, and Stephen Weinberg, “The Allocation of Attention: Theory an…
Teck-Hua Ho
economist · 4 mentions across 2 readings
In this course
Teck-Hua Ho is a behavioral economist known for work on level-k thinking and bounded rationality in game theory, examining how players iteratively reason about opponents' strategies rather than assuming full rationality. His framework appears in the course readings' discussions of decision-making under cognitive constraints, where models of finite reasoning steps help explain divergences from classical game-theoretic predictions. The excerpts suggest his work bridges economic theory and empirical limits on human strategic cognition, relevant to understanding how artificial and human agents navigate strategic interaction.
Mentioned in 2 readings
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Rosemarie Nagel 3Colin F. Camerer 2Colin Camerer 2Keith Weigelt 2Aaron Swartz 1Carole L. Crumley 1David Stark 1Finn Brunton 1Helen Nissenbaum 1Hugh Davies 1Mark Lombardi 1Brit Grosskopf 1Charles Holt 1Dale Stahl 1Daniel Kahneman 1David Laibson 1Ernan Haruvy 1Guillermo Moloche 1Jacob Goeree 1John C. Harsanyi 1John Maynard Keynes 1Jun Zhang 1Reinhard Selten 1Reinhard Tietz 1Stephen Weinberg 1Thomas Palfrey 1Trey Hedden 1Wulf Albers 1Xavier Gabaix 1Bruno Broseta 1