Capra, C. Mónica, “Noisy Expectation Formation in One-shot Games,” PhD. thesis, 1999.
Chen, Yuxin, Ganesh Iyer, and Amit Pazgal, “Limited Memory and Market Competition,” Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley, 2003.
Chong, Kuan…Gabaix, Xavier, and David Laibson, “A Boundedly Rational Decision Algorithm,” American Economic Review, XC (May 2000), 433–438.
Gabaix, Xavier, David Laibson, Guillermo Moloche, and Stephen Weinberg, “The Allocation of Attention: Theory an…Rapoport, Amnon, and Richard B. Boebel, “Mixed Strategies in Strictly Competitive Games: A Further Test of the Minimax Hypothesis,” Games and Economic Behavior, IV (1992), 261–283.
Rapoport, Amnon, and Darryl A. Seale, “Coordination Succes…
Colin F. Camerer
economist · 3 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Colin F. Camerer is a behavioral economist known for empirical work on bounded rationality and decision-making under uncertainty, particularly through experimental game theory. In these readings, he appears primarily as part of foundational citations on how cognitive limitations shape strategic behavior and market interactions, grounding arguments about why perfect rationality models fail to predict actual human and computational behavior. His work enables the course's broader examination of how AI systems must account for the messy, limited rationality that characterizes both human agents and emergent networked systems.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Rosemarie Nagel 2Amnon Rapoport 1Barry O'Neill 1Barry Sopher 1Bernhardt Lieberman 1Charles R. Plott 1David M. Grether 1David M. Messick 1Dilip Mookerjee 1H. Solomon 1J. H. Criswell 1Jack Ochs 1John M. Allman 1Mario Livio 1Nancy Stokey 1Patrick Suppes 1Paul Milgrom 1Richard D. McKelvey 1Stephanie Kovalchik 1Thomas R. Palfrey 1Wilfred Amaldoss 1Amit Pazgal 1Bruno Broseta 1C. Mónica Capra 1David Cooper 1Erik Eyster 1Ernst Fehr 1Ganesh Iyer 1Giovanna Devetag 1Jean-Robert Tyran 1