Denote another player $-i$’s strategy by $s{-i}^j$, and player $i$’s payoffs from choosing $si^j$ when the other player chooses $s{-i}^j$ by $\pii(si^j, s{-i}^j)$. Given the $k$-step thinker’s beliefs, the expected payoff to a $k$-step thin…A COGNITIVE HIERARCHY MODEL 879
TABLE IV
MODEL FIT (LOG-LIKELIHOOD LL AND MEAN SQUARED DEVIATION MSD)
| Data set | Stahl and Wilson | Cooper and Van Huyck | Costa-Gomes et al. | Mixed | Entry |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :--…The graphs enable us to answer an important question visually: when the Nash predictions are good approximations, is Poisson-CH almost as accurate? The answer appears to be yes, because there are few points with low Nash deviations and high…
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