The research question is whether players use the nominal payoff, or act as if they calculated real payoffs. If players use real payoffs and are in equilibrium, they will either choose prices of 11 and 14 (depending on which of two cost stru…theme of this paper, the model can explain when Nash equilibrium is reached surprisingly quickly (in the substitutes treatment), and can also explain when behavior is far from equilibrium (in the complements treatment). More importantly, th…Gabaix, Xavier, and David Laibson, “A Boundedly Rational Decision Algorithm,” American Economic Review, XC (May 2000), 433–438.
Gabaix, Xavier, David Laibson, Guillermo Moloche, and Stephen Weinberg, “The Allocation of Attention: Theory an…
Jean-Robert Tyran
economist · 3 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Jean-Robert Tyran appears in the course readings as an experimental economist studying bounded rationality and how agents deviate from classical equilibrium predictions in strategic settings. His work on nominal versus real payoff use in games illustrates how cognitive constraints and framing effects shape behavior in market interactions—a key concern for understanding AI systems trained on human data and the gap between theoretical rationality and actual decision-making. The excerpts suggest his research helps explain when markets converge to equilibrium rapidly versus when they exhibit persistent deviations, contributing to the course's broader investigation of how computational and human rationality diverge in complex systems.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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Ernst Fehr 3Amit Pazgal 1Bruno Broseta 1C. Mónica Capra 1Colin F. Camerer 1David Cooper 1Erik Eyster 1Ganesh Iyer 1Giovanna Devetag 1John Van Huyck 1Kuan Chong 1Massimo Warglien 1Matthew Rabin 1Miguel Costa-Gomes 1R. Zwick 1Russell W. Cooper 1Teck Ho 1Vincent Crawford 1Yuxin Chen 1Groucho Marx 1Sovik 1