In 1982, Milgrom and Stokey proved a remarkable “Groucho Marx theorem”: If rationality is common knowledge, risk-averse players should not make speculative bets with one another (unless they have hedging motives). Of course, speculation goe…Capra, C. Mónica, “Noisy Expectation Formation in One-shot Games,” PhD. thesis, 1999.
Chen, Yuxin, Ganesh Iyer, and Amit Pazgal, “Limited Memory and Market Competition,” Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley, 2003.
Chong, Kuan…[^]: This research was supported by NSF grants SES-0078911 and SES-0078853. Thanks to C. Mónica Capra, Haitao Cui, Paul Glimcher, and Roger Myerson. Sara Robinson was a helpful wordsmith. Former math nerd Matthew Rabin directed our attentio…
Matthew Rabin
economist · 3 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Matthew Rabin is a behavioral economist known for work on bounded rationality and how cognitive limitations shape economic decision-making, appearing here as a contributor to discussions of non-rational actor models in game theory and market behavior. His involvement in the readings situates him within critiques of the rational actor assumption that undergird traditional economic models—a crucial counterpoint to mechanistic views of human decision-making in markets and systems. He functions as part of the intellectual infrastructure for understanding how AI and algorithmic systems must account for actual human behavior rather than idealized rational agents.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
C. Mónica Capra 2Erik Eyster 2Amit Pazgal 1Bruno Broseta 1Colin F. Camerer 1David Cooper 1Ernst Fehr 1Ganesh Iyer 1Giovanna Devetag 1Jean-Robert Tyran 1John Van Huyck 1Kuan Chong 1Massimo Warglien 1Miguel Costa-Gomes 1R. Zwick 1Russell W. Cooper 1Teck Ho 1Vincent Crawford 1Yuxin Chen 1Alvin E. Gilat 1Doron Sonsino 1Groucho Marx 1Ido Erev 1Nancy Stokey 1Paul Milgrom 1Yosef Sovik 1Brian Rogers 1Edward Glaeser 1Haitao Cui 1Lisa Wang 1