Denote a $k$-step player’s belief about the proportion of $h$-step players by $gk(h)$. We assume that players doing $k \geq 1$ steps do not realize that others are using more than $k$ steps of thinking (that is, $gk(h) = 0, \forall h \geq k…Capra, C. Mónica, “Noisy Expectation Formation in One-shot Games,” PhD. thesis, 1999.
Chen, Yuxin, Ganesh Iyer, and Amit Pazgal, “Limited Memory and Market Competition,” Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley, 2003.
Chong, Kuan…
Ganesh Iyer
other · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Ganesh Iyer appears in these readings primarily as a co-author on work examining bounded rationality and cognitive limitations in market competition, specifically how agents with limited memory and computational capacity interact strategically. The citation suggests his contribution to understanding how realistic constraints on human cognition—rather than idealized rational actor models—shape economic behavior and algorithmic decision-making. This theoretical framework is relevant to the seminar's interest in how AI systems must model and interact with human agents whose reasoning is fundamentally limited and stepwise rather than globally optimal.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Yuxin Chen 2Amit Pazgal 1Bruno Broseta 1C. Mónica Capra 1Colin F. Camerer 1David Cooper 1Erik Eyster 1Ernst Fehr 1Giovanna Devetag 1Jean-Robert Tyran 1John Van Huyck 1Kuan Chong 1Massimo Warglien 1Matthew Rabin 1Miguel Costa-Gomes 1R. Zwick 1Russell W. Cooper 1Teck Ho 1Vincent Crawford 1Ami Pazgal 1Colin Camerer and Dan Lovallo 1David Laibson 1Xavier Gabaix 1