In 1982, Milgrom and Stokey proved a remarkable “Groucho Marx theorem”: If rationality is common knowledge, risk-averse players should not make speculative bets with one another (unless they have hedging motives). Of course, speculation goe…Capra, C. Mónica, “Noisy Expectation Formation in One-shot Games,” PhD. thesis, 1999.
Chen, Yuxin, Ganesh Iyer, and Amit Pazgal, “Limited Memory and Market Competition,” Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley, 2003.
Chong, Kuan…
Erik Eyster
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Erik Eyster is an economist studying bounded rationality and belief formation under uncertainty, particularly how agents learn and form expectations when information is incomplete or cognitively demanding. His work appears in the course readings as part of a broader discussion of how real market actors and game players deviate from the rational expectations assumption—establishing that speculation, disagreement, and heterogeneous beliefs persist even among sophisticated agents. This connects directly to the course's interest in how AI systems might model or replicate these imperfect human reasoning patterns, and how understanding cognitive limitations informs both market behavior and the design of adaptive algorithms.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Matthew Rabin 2Amit Pazgal 1Bruno Broseta 1C. Mónica Capra 1Colin F. Camerer 1David Cooper 1Ernst Fehr 1Ganesh Iyer 1Giovanna Devetag 1Jean-Robert Tyran 1John Van Huyck 1Kuan Chong 1Massimo Warglien 1Miguel Costa-Gomes 1R. Zwick 1Russell W. Cooper 1Teck Ho 1Vincent Crawford 1Yuxin Chen 1Alvin E. Gilat 1Doron Sonsino 1Groucho Marx 1Ido Erev 1Nancy Stokey 1Paul Milgrom 1Yosef Sovik 1