Pandaemonium Architecture 6.0

In this course

Teck Ho is a behavioral economist known for experimental research on bounded rationality and strategic thinking in games, particularly through the "cognitive hierarchy" model that explains how players with limited lookahead reasoning engage in strategic interaction. He appears in these readings primarily as a co-author with Colin Camerer on foundational papers (HCW 98, CHC, CHW) that empirically test theories of non-rational equilibrium play and finite-step reasoning. His work is cited to ground the seminar's exploration of how artificial agents—and humans—actually compute strategy under computational constraints, relevant to understanding realistic intelligence beyond perfect rationality.

Mentioned in 1 reading

Colin F. Camerer, Teck-Hua Ho, et al.

A Cognitive Hierarchy Theory of Games

4

The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. Section III collects some theoretical results. Section IV reports estimation of the τ parameter from six classes of games. Section V explores the “economic value” of C…Another possibility is to assume that k-step players realize there are other k-step thinkers (g<sub>k</sub>(k) > 0). Self-awareness of this sort is a step away from the goal of creating a precise disequilibrium theory, because it imposes co…a. HCW (98) is Ho, Camerer, Weigelt AER 98; CHC are new data from Camerer, Ho, and Chong; CHW is Camerer, Ho, Weigelt (unpublished); Kovalchik is data reported by Kovalchik et al. [in press]. values derived from simple axioms mentioned abo…

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Appears alongside

People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.