Another possibility is to assume that k-step players realize there are other k-step thinkers (g<sub>k</sub>(k) > 0). Self-awareness of this sort is a step away from the goal of creating a precise disequilibrium theory, because it imposes co…Capra, C. Mónica, “Noisy Expectation Formation in One-shot Games,” PhD. thesis, 1999.
Chen, Yuxin, Ganesh Iyer, and Amit Pazgal, “Limited Memory and Market Competition,” Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley, 2003.
Chong, Kuan…
Antoni Bosch-Domenech
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Without a Wikipedia entry, Bosch-Domenech appears primarily through citation in game theory and behavioral economics literature focused on bounded rationality and strategic thinking. The excerpts suggest involvement in work on k-level thinking and the cognitive constraints that govern how agents form expectations and interact in strategic situations, which would be relevant to understanding how artificial agents (and humans) model each other's decision-making under incomplete information. His presence here signals the course's engagement with the gap between idealized rational choice theory and the messy cognitive reality that both human and machine learning systems must navigate.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Colin Camerer 1Dale Stahl 1Keith Weigelt 1Robert Wilson 1Teck Ho 1Albert Satorra 1Chris Proulx 1Colin F. Camerer 1Daniel Lovallo 1David Porter 1Drazen Prelec 1George Loewenstein 1H. C. Kunreuther 1Hongbin Cai 1Jeffrey Banks 1Joe Swierzbinski 1Jose G. Montalvo 1Joseph Wang 1Juin-Kuan Chong 1Kenneth Binmore 1Robert Bloomfield 1Rosemarie Nagel 1S. J. Hoch 1Teck-Hua Ho 1