Another possibility is to assume that k-step players realize there are other k-step thinkers (g<sub>k</sub>(k) > 0). Self-awareness of this sort is a step away from the goal of creating a precise disequilibrium theory, because it imposes co…Banks, Jeffrey, Colin F. Camerer, and David Porter, “Experimental Tests of Nash
Refinements in Signaling Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, VI (1994),
1–31.
Binmore, Kenneth, “Modeling Rational Players: Part II,” Economics and Philos-
oph…
Antoni Bosch-Domenech
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Bosch-Domenech appears in the course materials only as a passing reference within a bibliography of experimental game theory citations, likely contributing to empirical work on bounded rationality or strategic reasoning in laboratory settings. Without fuller context, his exact contribution to the seminar's concerns with AI rationality and computational modeling remains unclear, though his citation among game theorists suggests relevance to how human and machine decision-making deviates from perfect rationality assumptions.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Colin Camerer 1Dale Stahl 1Keith Weigelt 1Robert Wilson 1Teck Ho 1Albert Satorra 1Chris Proulx 1Colin F. Camerer 1Daniel Lovallo 1David Porter 1Drazen Prelec 1George Loewenstein 1H. C. Kunreuther 1Hongbin Cai 1Jeffrey Banks 1Joe Swierzbinski 1Jose G. Montalvo 1Joseph Wang 1Juin-Kuan Chong 1Kenneth Binmore 1Robert Bloomfield 1Rosemarie Nagel 1S. J. Hoch 1Teck-Hua Ho 1