There are many challenges in future research. An obvious one is to endogenize the mean number of thinking steps $\tau$, presumably from some kind of cost-benefit analysis in which players weigh the marginal benefits of thinking further agai…Banks, Jeffrey, Colin F. Camerer, and David Porter, “Experimental Tests of Nash
Refinements in Signaling Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, VI (1994),
1–31.
Binmore, Kenneth, “Modeling Rational Players: Part II,” Economics and Philos-
oph…
Drazen Prelec
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Based on these excerpts, Prelec appears to be cited in a bibliography or reference section focused on experimental and theoretical economics, though the specific excerpt provided is cut off. He likely contributes to debates about rational decision-making, behavioral economics, or game theory—fields that intersect with questions of how cognitive constraints shape human reasoning. His work seems relevant to the course's investigation of bounded rationality and the gap between idealized algorithmic thinking and actual human cognition in systems involving AI and decision-making.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
George Loewenstein 2Ariel Rubinstein 1Chong 1Colin Camerer 1Costas-Gomes 1Crawford 1Ho 1Albert Satorra 1Antoni Bosch-Domenech 1Chris Proulx 1Colin F. Camerer 1Daniel Lovallo 1David Porter 1H. C. Kunreuther 1Hongbin Cai 1Jeffrey Banks 1Joe Swierzbinski 1Jose G. Montalvo 1Joseph Wang 1Juin-Kuan Chong 1Kenneth Binmore 1Robert Bloomfield 1Rosemarie Nagel 1S. J. Hoch 1Teck-Hua Ho 1