There are many challenges in future research. An obvious one is to endogenize the mean number of thinking steps $\tau$, presumably from some kind of cost-benefit analysis in which players weigh the marginal benefits of thinking further agai…Rapoport, Amnon, and Richard B. Boebel, “Mixed Strategies in Strictly Competitive Games: A Further Test of the Minimax Hypothesis,” Games and Economic Behavior, IV (1992), 261–283.
Rapoport, Amnon, and Darryl A. Seale, “Coordination Succes…
Ariel Rubinstein
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Ariel Rubinstein is a game theorist known for work on bounded rationality and cognitive constraints in strategic interaction, appearing here in the context of formalizing how players' thinking costs shape equilibrium behavior. The course readings invoke him to ground discussions of endogenizing cognitive effort—the idea that we must model not just what agents decide but the computational expense of deciding itself. This frames game theory as a tool for understanding decision-making under real cognitive limits rather than assuming unbounded rational calculation.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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