There are many challenges in future research. An obvious one is to endogenize the mean number of thinking steps $\tau$, presumably from some kind of cost-benefit analysis in which players weigh the marginal benefits of thinking further agai…Banks, Jeffrey, Colin F. Camerer, and David Porter, “Experimental Tests of Nash
Refinements in Signaling Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, VI (1994),
1–31.
Binmore, Kenneth, “Modeling Rational Players: Part II,” Economics and Philos-
oph…
George Loewenstein
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
George Loewenstein is an influential behavioral economist known for studying how emotions, time preferences, and cognitive limitations shape decision-making in ways classical rational choice theory fails to capture. In these excerpts, he appears as a foundational reference for modeling the cognitive costs of thinking and deliberation—specifically, the idea that rational agents must weigh the marginal benefits of further analysis against real constraints on mental effort. His work enables the course readings to move beyond idealized rational actors toward more realistic accounts of bounded rationality relevant to AI systems and their interaction with human decision-makers.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Drazen Prelec 2Ariel Rubinstein 1Chong 1Colin Camerer 1Costas-Gomes 1Crawford 1Ho 1Albert Satorra 1Antoni Bosch-Domenech 1Chris Proulx 1Colin F. Camerer 1Daniel Lovallo 1David Porter 1H. C. Kunreuther 1Hongbin Cai 1Jeffrey Banks 1Joe Swierzbinski 1Jose G. Montalvo 1Joseph Wang 1Juin-Kuan Chong 1Kenneth Binmore 1Robert Bloomfield 1Rosemarie Nagel 1S. J. Hoch 1Teck-Hua Ho 1