In our experiments, subjects played five entry games with no feedback. If the number of entrants was above (less than or equal to) $d$, the entrants earned 0 ($1); nonentrants earned $.50. Subjects also played 22 matrix games with mixed equ…Banks, Jeffrey, Colin F. Camerer, and David Porter, “Experimental Tests of Nash
Refinements in Signaling Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, VI (1994),
1–31.
Binmore, Kenneth, “Modeling Rational Players: Part II,” Economics and Philos-
oph…
Robert Bloomfield
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Robert Bloomfield appears in the course readings only as a passing reference within a bibliographic context on experimental economics and game theory. The excerpts suggest he is cited alongside researchers studying how humans deviate from rational actor models in controlled laboratory settings, particularly in games with mixed strategy equilibria. His work seems relevant to the seminar's interest in how computational and mathematical models of decision-making fail to capture actual human behavior—a tension central to understanding the limits of algorithmic reasoning in systems designed to model or predict social interaction.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Anatol Rapoport 1Barry O'Neill 1Barry Sopher 1Benoit Proulx 1Bernard Lieberman 1Charles Holt 1Colin Camerer 1David Messick 1Dilip Mookerjee 1Erich Boebel 1Fang-Fang Tang 1Jack Ochs 1Jacob Goeree 1Joseph Swierzbinski 1Ken Binmore 1Thomas Palfrey 1Wilfred Amaldoss 1Albert Satorra 1Antoni Bosch-Domenech 1Chris Proulx 1Colin F. Camerer 1Daniel Lovallo 1David Porter 1Drazen Prelec 1George Loewenstein 1H. C. Kunreuther 1Hongbin Cai 1Jeffrey Banks 1Joe Swierzbinski 1Jose G. Montalvo 1