The entry and mixed-equilibrium games were run in four experimental sessions of twelve subjects each. Each game was played (with no feedback) against a random opponent in the same session and earnings accumulated. Two sessions used undergra…Capra, C. Mónica, “Noisy Expectation Formation in One-shot Games,” PhD. thesis, 1999.
Chen, Yuxin, Ganesh Iyer, and Amit Pazgal, “Limited Memory and Market Competition,” Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley, 2003.
Chong, Kuan…
Robert Bloomfield
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Robert Bloomfield appears as a passing reference in experimental game theory literature used in the course readings, likely affiliated with research on behavioral economics and agent decision-making under uncertainty. His work surfaces in the context of studying how human subjects form expectations and behave in strategic interactions, which connects to broader questions about bounded rationality and computational modeling of economic agents—themes relevant to understanding how AI systems might simulate or diverge from human economic behavior.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Anatol Rapoport 1Barry O'Neill 1Barry Sopher 1Benoit Proulx 1Bernard Lieberman 1Charles Holt 1Colin Camerer 1David Messick 1Dilip Mookerjee 1Erich Boebel 1Fang-Fang Tang 1Jack Ochs 1Jacob Goeree 1Joseph Swierzbinski 1Ken Binmore 1Thomas Palfrey 1Wilfred Amaldoss 1Albert Satorra 1Antoni Bosch-Domenech 1Chris Proulx 1Colin F. Camerer 1Daniel Lovallo 1David Porter 1Drazen Prelec 1George Loewenstein 1H. C. Kunreuther 1Hongbin Cai 1Jeffrey Banks 1Joe Swierzbinski 1Jose G. Montalvo 1