In our experiments, subjects played five entry games with no feedback. If the number of entrants was above (less than or equal to) $d$, the entrants earned 0 ($1); nonentrants earned $.50. Subjects also played 22 matrix games with mixed equ…Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).
Selten, Reinhard, “Features of Experimentally Observed Bounded Rationality,” European Economic Review, XLII (1998), 413–436.
Sonsino, Doron, Ido Er…
Fang-Fang Tang
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Fang-Fang Tang appears to be an experimental economist studying bounded rationality and strategic behavior in game theory contexts. The excerpts show Tang's work testing how human subjects deviate from rational equilibrium predictions in entry games and mixed-strategy scenarios, contributing empirical data to the behavioral economics literature that challenges classical game theory assumptions. This research is relevant to the seminar's interest in how real agents (human or machine) navigate strategic environments and make decisions under constraints, informing discussions of rationality, optimization, and emergent behavior in complex systems.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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Anatol Rapoport 1Barry O'Neill 1Barry Sopher 1Benoit Proulx 1Bernard Lieberman 1Charles Holt 1Colin Camerer 1David Messick 1Dilip Mookerjee 1Erich Boebel 1Jack Ochs 1Jacob Goeree 1Joseph Swierzbinski 1Ken Binmore 1Robert Bloomfield 1Thomas Palfrey 1Wilfred Amaldoss 1Dale O. Stahl 1Doron Sonsino 1Georg Weizsäcker 1Ido Erev 1John Van Huyck 1Paul Wilson 1Ray Battalio 1Reinhard Selten 1Richard Beil 1Sharon Gilat 1Thomas Schelling 1Ylva Sovik 1