tially, it is easy to see how perfect equilibration could occur:
exactly $d$ of $N$ players would enter, because all the later entrants
would know how many earlier players had entered. (For example,
in a subgame perfect equilibrium the firs…In our experiments, subjects played five entry games with no feedback. If the number of entrants was above (less than or equal to) $d$, the entrants earned 0 ($1); nonentrants earned $.50. Subjects also played 22 matrix games with mixed equ…
Anatol Rapoport
scientist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Rapoport was a mathematician and game theorist whose work bridged formal analysis and experimental behavioral study, establishing methods for testing how actual human players deviate from theoretical equilibrium predictions. In these excerpts, his framework appears embedded in experimental game theory designs—the entry games and matrix games with mixed equilibria represent the kind of controlled laboratory settings Rapoport pioneered to observe decision-making under strategic uncertainty. His influence here is methodological: the readings use his experimental apparatus to demonstrate gaps between rational theory and human behavior, a tension central to understanding how minds and systems (human and artificial) actually operate under constraint.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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