tially, it is easy to see how perfect equilibration could occur:
exactly $d$ of $N$ players would enter, because all the later entrants
would know how many earlier players had entered. (For example,
in a subgame perfect equilibrium the firs…The entry and mixed-equilibrium games were run in four experimental sessions of twelve subjects each. Each game was played (with no feedback) against a random opponent in the same session and earnings accumulated. Two sessions used undergra…
Anatol Rapoport
scientist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Rapoport was a mathematician and game theorist who conducted foundational experimental work on how humans actually behave in strategic situations, diverging from purely rational equilibrium predictions. His empirical studies of entry games and mixed-strategy play appear here as evidence that real players deviate systematically from theoretical optima, grounding discussions of bounded rationality and feedback mechanisms in game-theoretic contexts. This work matters for the course because it bridges formal models of strategic interaction—central to cybernetics and AI design—with the messy reality of human decision-making that any intelligent system must eventually contend with.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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