In our experiments, subjects played five entry games with no feedback. If the number of entrants was above (less than or equal to) $d$, the entrants earned 0 ($1); nonentrants earned $.50. Subjects also played 22 matrix games with mixed equ…Kovalchik, Stephanie, Colin F. Camerer, David M. Grether, Charles R. Plott, and John M. Allman, “Aging and Decision Making: A Broad Comparative Study of Decision Behavior in Neurologically Healthy Elderly and Young Individuals,” Journal of …
Barry O'Neill
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Barry O'Neill appears as a passing reference in experimental game theory contexts, likely contributing methodological or theoretical work on mixed-strategy equilibria and decision-making under uncertainty. The excerpts suggest he's cited in connection with empirical studies of how subjects behave in entry games and matrix games, which are foundational setups for understanding bounded rationality and strategic behavior in networked systems. His work enables the course's examination of how actual agents deviate from classical game-theoretic predictions—a crucial bridge between abstract cybernetic models and real human behavior in algorithmic or competitive environments.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Barry Sopher 2Dilip Mookerjee 2Jack Ochs 2Wilfred Amaldoss 2Anatol Rapoport 1Benoit Proulx 1Bernard Lieberman 1Charles Holt 1Colin Camerer 1David Messick 1Erich Boebel 1Fang-Fang Tang 1Jacob Goeree 1Joseph Swierzbinski 1Ken Binmore 1Robert Bloomfield 1Thomas Palfrey 1Amnon Rapoport 1Bernhardt Lieberman 1Charles R. Plott 1Colin F. Camerer 1David M. Grether 1David M. Messick 1H. Solomon 1J. H. Criswell 1John M. Allman 1Mario Livio 1Nancy Stokey 1Patrick Suppes 1Paul Milgrom 1