The entry and mixed-equilibrium games were run in four experimental sessions of twelve subjects each. Each game was played (with no feedback) against a random opponent in the same session and earnings accumulated. Two sessions used undergra…Rapoport, Amnon, and Richard B. Boebel, “Mixed Strategies in Strictly Competitive Games: A Further Test of the Minimax Hypothesis,” Games and Economic Behavior, IV (1992), 261–283.
Rapoport, Amnon, and Darryl A. Seale, “Coordination Succes…
Barry O'Neill
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Barry O'Neill appears only as a passing reference in these excerpts, cited within bibliographies of game theory experiments rather than substantively engaged in the readings themselves. The fragments suggest he contributed to empirical work on mixed strategies and equilibrium play in competitive games, likely in the 1990s experimental economics literature. Without clearer excerpts demonstrating his direct role in the course's arguments about AI, cybernetics, or computational systems, his relevance to Pandaemonium Architecture remains unclear from these materials.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Barry Sopher 2Dilip Mookerjee 2Jack Ochs 2Wilfred Amaldoss 2Amnon Rapoport 1Bernhardt Lieberman 1Charles R. Plott 1Colin F. Camerer 1David M. Grether 1David M. Messick 1H. Solomon 1J. H. Criswell 1John M. Allman 1Mario Livio 1Nancy Stokey 1Patrick Suppes 1Paul Milgrom 1Richard D. McKelvey 1Rosemarie Nagel 1Stephanie Kovalchik 1Thomas R. Palfrey 1Anatol Rapoport 1Benoit Proulx 1Bernard Lieberman 1Charles Holt 1Colin Camerer 1David Messick 1Erich Boebel 1Fang-Fang Tang 1Jacob Goeree 1