There are other games where players are surprisingly close to equilibrium, however. Consider a stylized business entry game, in which n players decide simultaneously whether to enter a market with known demand d, where d < n. The payoffs ar…The entry and mixed-equilibrium games were run in four experimental sessions of twelve subjects each. Each game was played (with no feedback) against a random opponent in the same session and earnings accumulated. Two sessions used undergra…
Ken Binmore
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Ken Binmore is a game theorist and experimental economist known for testing how real players deviate from theoretical equilibrium predictions in laboratory settings. His work appears in the course readings through experimental studies of mixed-strategy equilibria and market entry games, where he and colleagues observe that human subjects fail to play according to Nash equilibrium predictions even after repeated play. This research grounds the seminar's interest in the gap between mathematical models of rational behavior (central to early AI and cybernetics) and actual human decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and competition.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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