There are other games where players are surprisingly close to equilibrium, however. Consider a stylized business entry game, in which n players decide simultaneously whether to enter a market with known demand d, where d < n. The payoffs ar…In our experiments, subjects played five entry games with no feedback. If the number of entrants was above (less than or equal to) $d$, the entrants earned 0 ($1); nonentrants earned $.50. Subjects also played 22 matrix games with mixed equ…
Ken Binmore
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Ken Binmore is a game theorist known for experimental work on how players actually behave in strategic situations compared to theoretical predictions. In these readings, his entry game experiments serve as empirical evidence that real agents deviate systematically from Nash equilibrium play, complicating computational models of rational decision-making in networked systems. This matters for the seminar's interest in how AI systems trained on game-theoretic assumptions encounter messy human behavior in practice.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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