Pandaemonium Architecture 6.0

In this course

Reinhard Selten is a game theorist known for developing refinements of Nash equilibrium, particularly subgame perfect equilibrium, which addresses the problem of implausible equilibria in sequential games. The course readings invoke his work implicitly through discussions of equilibrium selection and bounded rationality in multi-agent systems, where the question of which equilibrium agents converge to becomes central to understanding strategic interaction under computational and informational constraints. His theoretical framework underlies contemporary work on how agents actually coordinate in games with multiple equilibria, a concern critical to modeling AI systems making decisions in competitive or cooperative settings.

Mentioned in 1 reading

Colin F. Camerer, Teck-Hua Ho, et al.

A Cognitive Hierarchy Theory of Games

5

There are other games where players are surprisingly close to equilibrium, however. Consider a stylized business entry game, in which n players decide simultaneously whether to enter a market with known demand d, where d < n. The payoffs ar…Game theorists have developed concepts to refine intuitions about when the (L,L) or (H,H) equilibria are likely to arise. Our CH model can replicate some of these intuitions and predicts an important effect of group size which has been obse…Gabaix, Xavier, and David Laibson, “A Boundedly Rational Decision Algorithm,” American Economic Review, XC (May 2000), 433–438. Gabaix, Xavier, David Laibson, Guillermo Moloche, and Stephen Weinberg, “The Allocation of Attention: Theory an…

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