Pandaemonium Architecture 6.0

In this course

Selten is a foundational game theorist known for developing concepts of bounded rationality and iterative reasoning that challenge the assumption of perfect rational actors in strategic interaction. Though he appears only obliquely in these excerpts through the logic of game-theoretic analysis they employ—particularly the notion of "k-step thinking" where players reason iteratively about opponents' reasoning—his influence shapes how the readings model decision-making under cognitive constraints rather than infinite computational capacity. This framework becomes crucial for understanding how AI systems and human agents actually behave in networked, competitive environments rather than how idealized rational agents should behave.

Mentioned in 1 reading

Colin F. Camerer, Teck-Hua Ho, Juin-Kuan Chong

A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games

5

There are other games where players are surprisingly close to equilibrium, however. Consider a stylized business entry game, in which n players decide simultaneously whether to enter a market with known demand d, where d < n. The payoffs ar…In the two-player stag hunt game, 1-step thinkers choose H if x < 1/2 and choose L if x > 1/2 because they optimize against 0-step thinkers who randomize. (If x = 1/2, then all players randomize equally.) Higher-step thinkers do exactly wha…Kovalchik, Stephanie, Colin F. Camerer, David M. Grether, Charles R. Plott, and John M. Allman, “Aging and Decision Making: A Broad Comparative Study of Decision Behavior in Neurologically Healthy Elderly and Young Individuals,” Journal of …

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People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.