In the two-player stag hunt game, 1-step thinkers choose H if x < 1/2 and choose L if x > 1/2 because they optimize against 0-step thinkers who randomize. (If x = 1/2, then all players randomize equally.) Higher-step thinkers do exactly wha…In our experiments, subjects played five entry games with no feedback. If the number of entrants was above (less than or equal to) $d$, the entrants earned 0 ($1); nonentrants earned $.50. Subjects also played 22 matrix games with mixed equ…Banks, Jeffrey, Colin F. Camerer, and David Porter, “Experimental Tests of Nash
Refinements in Signaling Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, VI (1994),
1–31.
Binmore, Kenneth, “Modeling Rational Players: Part II,” Economics and Philos-
oph…
Van Huyck
other · 3 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Van Huyck appears as a behavioral game theorist whose experimental work on strategic thinking and equilibrium play is cited in the course's engagement with how actual agents—human or artificial—deviate from idealized rational models. The excerpts reference laboratory experiments testing iterated reasoning and mixed-strategy equilibria, suggesting Van Huyck's research helps ground discussions of bounded rationality and cognitive hierarchy theory within the seminar's broader concern with how intelligence (biological or computational) navigates multi-agent coordination problems. This connects to "Pandaemonium Architecture" insofar as understanding real behavioral patterns informs how we model decision-making in networked AI systems and human-machine interaction.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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