Figure: Table VII showing Game 4 from [Binmore et al. [2001] with payoffs and model predictions]
Caption: TABLE VII GAME 4 FROM BINMORE ET AL. [2001]
Figure text:
| | L | C | R | Data | Nash | CH |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T | 0, 0 …In our experiments, subjects played five entry games with no feedback. If the number of entrants was above (less than or equal to) $d$, the entrants earned 0 ($1); nonentrants earned $.50. Subjects also played 22 matrix games with mixed equ…Banks, Jeffrey, Colin F. Camerer, and David Porter, “Experimental Tests of Nash
Refinements in Signaling Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, VI (1994),
1–31.
Binmore, Kenneth, “Modeling Rational Players: Part II,” Economics and Philos-
oph…
Costa-Gomes
other · 3 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Costa-Gomes appears as a behavioral economist studying how human subjects deviate from Nash equilibrium predictions in experimental game theory settings. The excerpts show their work (likely co-authored with Binmore and others) using controlled laboratory games—entry games and matrix games with mixed strategies—to test whether real players follow theoretical economic models or exhibit systematic behavioral patterns. This empirical challenge to rational actor assumptions grounds discussions in the course about how computational and game-theoretic models fail to capture actual decision-making, relevant to understanding AI systems trained on human behavior.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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