[Figure: Table VI showing game 8 from Costa-Gomes et al. [2001]]
Caption: TABLE VI
GAME 8 FROM COSTA-GOMES ET AL. [2001]
Figure text:
| | L | R | Data | Nash | CH |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T | 45, 66 | 82, 31 | .92 | 1 | .82 |
| TM | 2…These cutpoints imply two properties: the cutpoints are always (weakly) monotonically increasing in $d$ for the $d < 1/2$ segment as long as $f(k-1) > f(k)$, $\forall k \ge 2$. For a Poisson $f(k)$, this is equivalent to $\tau \le 2$. Furth…| | Stahl and Wilson | Cooper and Van Huyck | Costa-Gomes et al. | Mixed | Entry |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Data set | Lower Upper | Lower Upper | Lower Upper | Lower Upper | Lower Upper |
| Game-specific $\tau$ | …
Costa-Gomes
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Costa-Gomes et al. conducted empirical game-theoretic experiments that measured how human players deviate from Nash equilibrium predictions, producing data sets now widely used to validate behavioral models in bounded rationality research. Their 2001 work appears in the readings as a benchmark dataset for comparing different models of strategic reasoning—specifically, their payoff matrices and observed player behavior are used to test whether cognitive hierarchy models or other bounded rationality frameworks better predict actual human decision-making than pure Nash equilibrium theory. The frequent citation suggests their experiments provide crucial empirical grounding for discussions of how AI systems should model or diverge from classical game theory when operating in human-centered environments.
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