one player will always be high and one low, and 2/3 times the average will be closer to the lower player’s number. Therefore, rational players want to choose the lowest number possible— zero. In the Poisson-CH model (with any distribution f…These cutpoints imply two properties: the cutpoints are always (weakly) monotonically increasing in $d$ for the $d < 1/2$ segment as long as $f(k-1) > f(k)$, $\forall k \ge 2$. For a Poisson $f(k)$, this is equivalent to $\tau \le 2$. Furth…| | Stahl and Wilson | Cooper and Van Huyck | Costa-Gomes et al. | Mixed | Entry |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Data set | Lower Upper | Lower Upper | Lower Upper | Lower Upper | Lower Upper |
| Game-specific $\tau$ | …
Cooper
other · 3 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Without a clear Wikipedia entry, Cooper appears here as an experimental economist studying bounded rationality and equilibrium selection in game theory, likely the David J. Cooper known for work on coordination games and level-k reasoning. The readings cite Cooper and Van Huyck's empirical data on how players actually behave in strategic interactions—contrasting their measured parameter values with those from Stahl and Wilson or Costa-Gomes and colleagues—to ground theoretical models of player behavior in real experimental evidence rather than perfect rationality assumptions.
Background
Cooper, Cooper's, Coopers and similar may refer to:
Wikipedia →Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.