one player will always be high and one low, and 2/3 times the average will be closer to the lower player’s number. Therefore, rational players want to choose the lowest number possible— zero. In the Poisson-CH model (with any distribution f…In our experiments, subjects played five entry games with no feedback. If the number of entrants was above (less than or equal to) $d$, the entrants earned 0 ($1); nonentrants earned $.50. Subjects also played 22 matrix games with mixed equ…Banks, Jeffrey, Colin F. Camerer, and David Porter, “Experimental Tests of Nash
Refinements in Signaling Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, VI (1994),
1–31.
Binmore, Kenneth, “Modeling Rational Players: Part II,” Economics and Philos-
oph…
Cooper
other · 3 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Cooper appears in course readings primarily as a collaborator on experimental game theory work examining how actual players deviate from rational equilibrium predictions in strategic settings. The excerpts reference experimental designs testing Nash refinements and mixed-strategy equilibria, suggesting Cooper's contribution involves empirical investigation of the gap between theoretical game models and human behavior—a crucial concern for understanding how rational-agent assumptions fail in real systems. This matters to Pandaemonium Architecture because it reveals the behavioral foundations (and failures) that any AI system modeling human decision-making must grapple with, especially as machine learning agents are trained on or interact with human strategic choices.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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