In our experiments, subjects played five entry games with no feedback. If the number of entrants was above (less than or equal to) $d$, the entrants earned 0 ($1); nonentrants earned $.50. Subjects also played 22 matrix games with mixed equ…Banks, Jeffrey, Colin F. Camerer, and David Porter, “Experimental Tests of Nash
Refinements in Signaling Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, VI (1994),
1–31.
Binmore, Kenneth, “Modeling Rational Players: Part II,” Economics and Philos-
oph…
Wilson
other · 3 mentions across 2 readings
In this course
Wilson appears only as a passing reference in the course bibliography, cited in the context of experimental economics and game theory literature alongside scholars like Banks, Camerer, and Porter. Without sufficient excerpted material establishing their direct theoretical contribution to the seminar's concerns with cybernetics and AI, their specific role in "Pandaemonium Architecture 6.0" remains unclear from these fragments.
Mentioned in 2 readings
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.