tion, competition neglect in business entry, incentive contracts, and macroeconomics (see our longer paper for some ideas along these lines). An example is Crawford’s [2003] model of optimal lying. He shows that if “some of the people can b…There are many challenges in future research. An obvious one is to endogenize the mean number of thinking steps $\tau$, presumably from some kind of cost-benefit analysis in which players weigh the marginal benefits of thinking further agai…These cutpoints imply two properties: the cutpoints are always (weakly) monotonically increasing in $d$ for the $d < 1/2$ segment as long as $f(k-1) > f(k)$, $\forall k \ge 2$. For a Poisson $f(k)$, this is equivalent to $\tau \le 2$. Furth…
Crawford
other · 3 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Crawford appears in the course readings primarily through his 2003 game-theoretic model of optimal lying, which examines strategic deception when agents can exploit limited rationality or incomplete information among other players. His work is cited to theorize how information asymmetry and cognitive constraints create opportunities for strategic misrepresentation, directly relevant to understanding how AI systems might exploit or be exploited by bounded rationality in adversarial settings.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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