In our experiments, subjects played five entry games with no feedback. If the number of entrants was above (less than or equal to) $d$, the entrants earned 0 ($1); nonentrants earned $.50. Subjects also played 22 matrix games with mixed equ…Banks, Jeffrey, Colin F. Camerer, and David Porter, “Experimental Tests of Nash
Refinements in Signaling Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, VI (1994),
1–31.
Binmore, Kenneth, “Modeling Rational Players: Part II,” Economics and Philos-
oph…[^4]: Allowing stochastic response gives rise to other models (and could easily be incorporated into CH). In quantal response equilibrium [Rosenthal 1989; McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, 1998], players’ beliefs and choices of other players are c…
Stahl
other · 3 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Stahl appears primarily as a citation in experimental economics and game theory literature, likely referring to foundational work on quantal response equilibrium or stochastic choice models in strategic interaction. The course readings invoke Stahl in discussions of how players deviate from perfectly rational Nash equilibrium behavior, particularly in models that incorporate probabilistic or "noisy" decision-making rather than deterministic outcomes. This work matters for understanding how AI systems and machine learning models must account for bounded rationality and stochastic behavior when modeling human decision-making in adversarial or competitive environments.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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