Finally, the ultimate goal of the laboratory honing of simple models is to explain behavior in the economy. Models of iterated thinking could prove useful in thinking about asset markets, speculation and betting, contract structure, and oth…[^14]: Our working paper notes that in games where beliefs about the choices of others are elicited (along with one’s own choices), the number of thinking steps sometimes shifts upward. Forcing somebody to articulate what they think others …
Ho
other · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Ho appears to be cited in the context of behavioral economics and experimental game theory, particularly regarding how agents form beliefs about others' choices through iterated reasoning. The excerpts suggest Ho's work on models of iterated thinking contributes to understanding strategic behavior in markets and games, especially when players are prompted to explicitly articulate their expectations of others' behavior. This framework appears relevant to the course's interest in how artificial and human cognition operate under conditions of mutual prediction and incomplete information.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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