There are many challenges in future research. An obvious one is to endogenize the mean number of thinking steps $\tau$, presumably from some kind of cost-benefit analysis in which players weigh the marginal benefits of thinking further agai…[^11]: Simple proof: the k-step thinker plays the equilibrium strategy, call it $se$, against a perceived mixture of types 0 to $k - 1$. The $k + 1$-step thinker faces a perceived mixture of types 0 to $k - 1$ (with relative weight $\sum{h=…[^18]: The results of Sonsino, Erev, and Gilat [2002] are even more consistent with CH, except that they report substantial betting and nonbetting rates by player IIs in states A and D (about 20 percent) which suggests that τ ≈ 1.
[^19]: T…
Ho
other · 3 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Ho appears only in passing as an empirical reference (Sonsino, Erev, and Ho [2002]) in a game-theoretic discussion of cognitive hierarchy models and bounded rationality. The citation is used to calibrate how many "steps of thinking" players actually perform in laboratory settings, supporting the model's assumptions about finite cognitive depth in strategic interaction.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.