In 1982, Milgrom and Stokey proved a remarkable “Groucho Marx theorem”: If rationality is common knowledge, risk-averse players should not make speculative bets with one another (unless they have hedging motives). Of course, speculation goe…Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).
Selten, Reinhard, “Features of Experimentally Observed Bounded Rationality,” European Economic Review, XLII (1998), 413–436.
Sonsino, Doron, Ido Er…[^18]: The results of Sonsino, Erev, and Gilat [2002] are even more consistent with CH, except that they report substantial betting and nonbetting rates by player IIs in states A and D (about 20 percent) which suggests that τ ≈ 1.
[^19]: T…
Ido Erev
psychologist · 3 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Ido Erev is an experimental economist studying bounded rationality and decision-making under uncertainty through laboratory games. His work with Sonsino and Gilat appears in the readings as empirical evidence testing theoretical models of strategic behavior, particularly in examining why real agents deviate from rational-actor predictions in betting and speculative scenarios. The course uses their experimental findings to ground discussions of how actual human reasoning diverges from idealized economic models, a tension central to understanding how artificial systems might replicate or transcend human cognitive limits.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Doron Sonsino 2Dale O. Stahl 1Fang-Fang Tang 1Georg Weizsäcker 1John Van Huyck 1Paul Wilson 1Ray Battalio 1Reinhard Selten 1Richard Beil 1Sharon Gilat 1Thomas Schelling 1Ylva Sovik 1Colin Camerer 1Daniel Kahneman 1Ernst Fehr 1Gilat 1Ho 1Jean-Robert Tyran 1Sonsino 1Weigelt 1Alvin E. Gilat 1Erik Eyster 1Groucho Marx 1Matthew Rabin 1Nancy Stokey 1Paul Milgrom 1Yosef Sovik 1