These examples illustrate how the Poisson-CH model can mix limited thinking with strategic thinking (through the behavior of players doing two or more steps of thinking), and as a result, generally fit data from one-shot games better than e…There are many challenges in future research. An obvious one is to endogenize the mean number of thinking steps $\tau$, presumably from some kind of cost-benefit analysis in which players weigh the marginal benefits of thinking further agai…[^]: This research was supported by NSF grants SES-0078911 and SES-0078853. Thanks to C. Mónica Capra, Haitao Cui, Paul Glimcher, and Roger Myerson. Sara Robinson was a helpful wordsmith. Former math nerd Matthew Rabin directed our attentio…
Thomas Schelling
economist · 3 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Schelling appears as a foundational theorist of strategic interaction and bounded rationality in game theory, though no direct excerpts attribute arguments to him by name. His framework of mixed thinking strategies—where players employ limited rather than fully rational deliberation—informs the Poisson-CH model discussed in these readings, which models how agents actually behave in one-shot games rather than assuming equilibrium play. The excerpts suggest Schelling's contribution enables the course's concern with how cognitive constraints reshape decision-making in strategic settings, a key bridge between classical game theory and more realistic models of human behavior under computational limits.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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