The column player prediction is plausible because R pays either 1 or 0, and players actually chose it 83 percent of the time. The Poisson-CH model reproduces this finding very closely because all players doing one or more steps of thinking …The main contribution is showing that the same model can explain limited equilibration in dominance-solvable games (like p-beauty contests) and the surprising accuracy of Nash equilibrium in some one-shot games, such as simultaneous binary …Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).
Selten, Reinhard, “Features of Experimentally Observed Bounded Rationality,” European Economic Review, XLII (1998), 413–436.
Sonsino, Doron, Ido Er…
Thomas Schelling
economist · 3 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Thomas Schelling's *The Strategy of Conflict* (1960) provides foundational game-theoretic concepts for understanding bounded rationality and focal points in decision-making under uncertainty. The course readings invoke Schelling alongside experimental game theory to explain why players converge on certain equilibria in some contexts but fail to equilibrate in others, bridging his strategic theory with contemporary models of limited cognitive steps. His work enables the course to examine how humans navigate multi-agent scenarios—a crucial concern when modeling AI systems that must predict and coordinate with other agents.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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