[^11]: Simple proof: the k-step thinker plays the equilibrium strategy, call it $se$, against a perceived mixture of types 0 to $k - 1$. The $k + 1$-step thinker faces a perceived mixture of types 0 to $k - 1$ (with relative weight $\sum{h=…[^18]: The results of Sonsino, Erev, and Gilat [2002] are even more consistent with CH, except that they report substantial betting and nonbetting rates by player IIs in states A and D (about 20 percent) which suggests that τ ≈ 1.
[^19]: T…
Weigelt
other · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Weigelt appears only as a passing reference in the course materials, cited within footnotes discussing cognitive hierarchy models and experimental game theory but without substantial direct engagement with their work. The excerpts suggest involvement in behavioral economics literature examining how players with different levels of strategic reasoning interact in games, though the specific contributions remain unclear from these fragments alone.
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