Denote another player $-i$’s strategy by $s{-i}^j$, and player $i$’s payoffs from choosing $si^j$ when the other player chooses $s{-i}^j$ by $\pii(si^j, s{-i}^j)$. Given the $k$-step thinker’s beliefs, the expected payoff to a $k$-step thin…| Subject pool or game | Source$^a$ | Group size | Sample size | Nash equil'm | Pred'n error | Data Mean | Data Std dev | Data Mode | $\tau$ | Fit of CH model Mean | Fit of CH model Error | Fit of CH model Std dev | Fit of CH model Mode | B…Capra, C. Mónica, “Noisy Expectation Formation in One-shot Games,” PhD. thesis, 1999.
Chen, Yuxin, Ganesh Iyer, and Amit Pazgal, “Limited Memory and Market Competition,” Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley, 2003.
Chong, Kuan…
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