The entry and mixed-equilibrium games were run in four experimental sessions of twelve subjects each. Each game was played (with no feedback) against a random opponent in the same session and earnings accumulated. Two sessions used undergra…Rapoport, Amnon, and Richard B. Boebel, “Mixed Strategies in Strictly Competitive Games: A Further Test of the Minimax Hypothesis,” Games and Economic Behavior, IV (1992), 261–283.
Rapoport, Amnon, and Darryl A. Seale, “Coordination Succes…
Jack Ochs
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Jack Ochs appears in the course readings as a collaborator on experimental game theory research, though the excerpts provided offer only fragmentary context. The references suggest his work examined strategic behavior in competitive and mixed-strategy games through controlled laboratory sessions, contributing empirical evidence to debates about how humans actually play games versus theoretical predictions. His experimental methodology—testing undergraduates in repeated games against random opponents—represents the kind of human-centered behavioral validation that grounds AI and game-theoretic models in observable reality, a concern central to understanding how computational systems learn from or diverge from human strategic reasoning.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Barry O'Neill 2Barry Sopher 2Dilip Mookerjee 2Wilfred Amaldoss 2Amnon Rapoport 1Bernhardt Lieberman 1Charles R. Plott 1Colin F. Camerer 1David M. Grether 1David M. Messick 1H. Solomon 1J. H. Criswell 1John M. Allman 1Mario Livio 1Nancy Stokey 1Patrick Suppes 1Paul Milgrom 1Richard D. McKelvey 1Rosemarie Nagel 1Stephanie Kovalchik 1Thomas R. Palfrey 1Anatol Rapoport 1Benoit Proulx 1Bernard Lieberman 1Charles Holt 1Colin Camerer 1David Messick 1Erich Boebel 1Fang-Fang Tang 1Jacob Goeree 1