In our experiments, subjects played five entry games with no feedback. If the number of entrants was above (less than or equal to) $d$, the entrants earned 0 ($1); nonentrants earned $.50. Subjects also played 22 matrix games with mixed equ…Gabaix, Xavier, and David Laibson, “A Boundedly Rational Decision Algorithm,” American Economic Review, XC (May 2000), 433–438.
Gabaix, Xavier, David Laibson, Guillermo Moloche, and Stephen Weinberg, “The Allocation of Attention: Theory an…
Charles Holt
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Charles Holt appears primarily as an experimental economist studying bounded rationality and strategic behavior through controlled laboratory games. His work on entry games and mixed-strategy equilibria provides empirical grounding for how human subjects actually deviate from rational actor assumptions in game-theoretic contexts. In the course context, Holt's experimental methodology becomes foundational for understanding why AI systems trained on human behavior or designed for human interaction cannot assume perfect rationality—a crucial consideration when modeling cybernetic systems that must account for real cognitive constraints and decision-making patterns.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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