Gabaix, Xavier, and David Laibson, “A Boundedly Rational Decision Algorithm,” American Economic Review, XC (May 2000), 433–438.
Gabaix, Xavier, David Laibson, Guillermo Moloche, and Stephen Weinberg, “The Allocation of Attention: Theory an…[^11]: Simple proof: the k-step thinker plays the equilibrium strategy, call it $se$, against a perceived mixture of types 0 to $k - 1$. The $k + 1$-step thinker faces a perceived mixture of types 0 to $k - 1$ (with relative weight $\sum{h=…
Massimo Warglien
economist · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Warglien appears in the course materials primarily through work on bounded rationality and cognitive hierarchies—frameworks that model how agents with limited computational resources make decisions under uncertainty. The citations to Gabaix and Laibson's bounded rationality model and the footnote's discussion of k-step thinking suggest Warglien's contributions to understanding strategic interaction when players have heterogeneous levels of reasoning depth, a concept crucial for analyzing both human behavior and the design constraints of artificial agents. This work bridges economic theory and cognitive science, directly relevant to how we theorize about AI systems operating in competitive or game-theoretic environments.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Amit Pazgal 1Bruno Broseta 1C. Mónica Capra 1Colin F. Camerer 1David Cooper 1Erik Eyster 1Ernst Fehr 1Ganesh Iyer 1Giovanna Devetag 1Jean-Robert Tyran 1John Van Huyck 1Kuan Chong 1Matthew Rabin 1Miguel Costa-Gomes 1R. Zwick 1Russell W. Cooper 1Teck Ho 1Vincent Crawford 1Yuxin Chen 1Gabriele Devetag 1Mario Livio 1Tara Hedden 1Yaacov Zhang 1