| Subject pool or game | Source$^a$ | Group size | Sample size | Nash equil'm | Pred'n error | Data Mean | Data Std dev | Data Mode | $\tau$ | Fit of CH model Mean | Fit of CH model Error | Fit of CH model Std dev | Fit of CH model Mode | B…a. HCW (98) is Ho, Camerer, Weigelt AER 98; CHC are new data from Camerer, Ho, and Chong; CHW is Camerer, Ho, Weigelt (unpublished); Kovalchik is data reported by Kovalchik et al. [in press].
values derived from simple axioms mentioned abo…A sensible intuition is that when stakes are higher, subjects will use more steps of reasoning (and may think others will think harder too). Rows 3 and 6 compare low stakes ($1 per person per period) and high stakes ($4) in games with an in…
Kovalchik
other · 3 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Kovalchik appears as a data source in experimental game theory research on strategic reasoning and Nash equilibrium play, cited in a table comparing prediction errors across multiple behavioral studies. The reference indicates Kovalchik et al.'s in-press work provided empirical data on how subjects behave in games, contributing to the broader analysis of whether players actually achieve theoretical equilibria or exhibit systematic deviations. This fits the course's concern with how theoretical models (Nash equilibrium, game theory) meet actual human behavior, a key tension in understanding bounded rationality and computational limits in strategic interaction.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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