When we ask for the meaning of a statement we are talking about language, and are using a metalanguage; and when we ask for the meaning of “meaning” we are using a metametalanguage, so it is not surprising that the question is difficult to …integer, for example, “3” can be defined as the class of all classes “similar” to the class consisting of the words “Newton,” “Gauss,” and “Bardot.”) The point of this representation is that it makes reference to linguistic operations alone…
Gottlob Frege
philosopher · 3 mentions across 2 readings
In this course
Frege appears primarily as a foundational figure in mathematical logic whose work on formal systems and the nature of meaning undergirds later developments in symbolic representation and computation. He is cited here mainly through Russell's famous 1902 letter pointing out the paradox in Frege's logical system, a moment that shaped how mathematicians and logicians thereafter thought about self-reference and the limits of formalization. His influence on the course concerns how formal languages can represent meaning through purely linguistic operations without direct reference to the world—a question central to understanding how machines might manipulate symbols to simulate thought.
Mentioned in 2 readings
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Bertrand Russell 3Antoine Lavoisier 1Charles Kay Ogden 1Charles Sanders Peirce 1Colin Cherry 1Ivor Armstrong Richards 1Max Black 1Brigitte Bardot 1Carl Friedrich Gauss 1Isaac Newton 1Paul Halmos 1Akos Egyed 1Alfred Tarski 1Brown 1Carl Craver 1Gordon Globus 1Grover Maxwell 1Herbert A. Simon 1Irving Savodnik 1J. A. Scott Kelso 1J. M. Spivey 1Jean van Heijenoort 1Jonathan Schaffer 1Leonard Linsky 1Michael A. Arbib 1Murray Gell-Mann 1Nenad Medvidovic 1Plotinus 1Robert C. Richardson 1Roberto Poli 1