For a typed variable to be an observable it must be interpreted, a correspondence that has inevitably been left informal. This interpretation cannot be omitted: a LoA composed of typed variables called simply x, y, z and so on and treated r…More interesting is the question of infinite regress. Tarski’s definition formalises certain specific properties of truth; a regress would obtain only were a complete characterisation sought. So it is with the interpretation required to def…Russell, B. (1902). Letter to Frege. In J. van Heijenoort (Ed.), From frege to gödel: A source book in mathematical logic, 1879–1931 (pp. 124–125). Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1967.
Salthe, S. N. (1985). Evolving hierarchical s…
Alfred Tarski
mathematician · 3 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Tarski appears primarily through his formalization of truth conditions, which the course readings invoke to address the problem of interpretation in observable variables and levels of abstraction. His work enables the argument that defining observables—like defining truth itself—need not fall into infinite regress if we accept that complete characterization is not required. He functions as a reference point for understanding how formal systems establish correspondence between symbols and their referents, a foundational concern for cybernetic and computational modeling in the course.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
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Akos Egyed 1Bertrand Russell 1Brown 1Carl Craver 1Gordon Globus 1Gottlob Frege 1Grover Maxwell 1Herbert A. Simon 1Irving Savodnik 1J. A. Scott Kelso 1J. M. Spivey 1Jean van Heijenoort 1Jonathan Schaffer 1Leonard Linsky 1Michael A. Arbib 1Murray Gell-Mann 1Nenad Medvidovic 1Plotinus 1Robert C. Richardson 1Roberto Poli 1Stanley Salthe 1William Bechtel 1William C. Wimsatt 1Zenon Pylyshyn 1Luciano Floridi 1Meno 1