Reality can be studied at different levels, so forms of “levelism” have often been advocated in the past.[^1] In the 1970s, levelism nicely dovetailed with the computational turn and became a standard approach both in science and in philoso…Block, N. (1997). Anti-reductionism slaps back. In J. E. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical perspectives 11: Mind, causation, and world (pp. 107–133). Oxford, New York: Blackwell.
Brown, H. C. (1916). Structural levels in the scientist’s world…
Ned Block
philosopher · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Ned Block is a philosopher of mind whose work on anti-reductionism and the structure of consciousness makes him crucial for debates about whether mental phenomena can be reduced to computational or neural processes. His 1997 intervention against reductionist approaches appears in the course readings as a counterweight to computational-era thinking, suggesting that consciousness and cognition may require explanations at multiple irreducible levels. This matters for "Pandaemonium Architecture 6.0" because it positions Block in opposition to the computational optimism that shaped AI and cognitive science, forcing the seminar to grapple with what gets lost when we treat mind purely as algorithmic process.
Mentioned in 1 reading
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Allen Newell 1Daniel Dennett 1David Marr 1Herbert Simon 1Hilary Putnam 1John Foster 1John Heil 1Jonathan Schaffer 1Mihajlo Mesarovic 1Paul Oppenheim 1William Wimsatt 1Akos Egyed 1Carl F. Craver 1Daniel C. Dennett 1Donald Davidson 1Harold Chapman Brown 1James E. Tomberlin 1Karsten Engelhardt 1Luciano Floridi 1Nenad Medvidovic 1Richard P. Feynman 1Tom Mailbaum 1Willem-Paul de Roever 1