Daniel Dennett has defended a view along these lines.[^5] And the
view just outlined gives voice to a theme of the property dualists
as well. Karl Popper and Joseph Margolis both cite the normative
nature of mental and linguistic activity a…---
[^5]: Most explicitly in "Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology" (forthcoming),
but this theme of Dennett's goes all the way back to his "Intentional Systems,"
this JOURNAL, LXVIII, 4 (Feb. 25, 1971): 87–106; reprinted in his Brainstorm…the sheer amount of information exchanged. The cable of the commissure consists of $\approx$200 million neurons,[^10] and even if we assume that each of these fibres is capable of one of only two possible states each second (a most conserva…
Karl Popper
philosopher · 4 mentions across 2 readings
In this course
Popper's falsifiability criterion and critical rationalism appear in these readings as a philosophical framework for understanding what resists mechanical reduction—specifically, the normative and intentional properties of mind and language that cannot be eliminated through empirical testing alone. His work, cited alongside Margolis and against Dennett's eliminativism, establishes that certain domains (mental activity, meaning-making) operate under logical constraints that place them beyond the reach of pure physical description, a move central to defending non-reductive accounts of consciousness and agency in systems theory.
Background
Sir Karl Raimund Popper was an Austrian–British philosopher, academic and social commentator. One of the 20th century's most influential philosophers of science, Popper is known for his rejection of the classical inductivist views on the scientific method in favour of empirical falsification made possible by his falsifiability criterion, and for founding the Department of Philosophy at the London School of Economics and Political Science. According to Popper, a theory in the empirical sciences can never be proven, but it can be falsified, meaning that it can be scrutinised with decisive experiments. Popper was opposed to the classical justificationist account of knowledge, which he replaced with "the first non-justificational philosophy of criticism in the history of philosophy", namely critical rationalism.
Wikipedia →Mentioned in 2 readings
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