Daniel Dennett has defended a view along these lines.<sup>5</sup> And the
view just outlined gives voice to a theme of the property dualists
as well. Karl Popper and Joseph Margolis both cite the normative
nature of mental and linguistic ac…---
<sup>5</sup>: Most explicitly in "Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology" (forthcoming),
but this theme of Dennett's goes all the way back to his "Intentional Systems,"
this JOURNAL, LXVIII, 4 (Feb. 25, 1971): 87–106; reprinted in his Br…
Joseph Margolis
philosopher · 3 mentions across 2 readings
In this course
Joseph Margolis is a philosopher who defends property dualism and emphasizes the normative character of mental and linguistic activity as irreducible to physical explanation. He appears here in dialogue with Dennett and Popper to anchor arguments about intentionality and the limits of computational or physicalist accounts of mind—a key tension in thinking through whether AI systems can capture what's distinctively human about meaning-making and normativity.
Mentioned in 2 readings
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