Daniel Dennett has defended a view along these lines.[^5] And the
view just outlined gives voice to a theme of the property dualists
as well. Karl Popper and Joseph Margolis both cite the normative
nature of mental and linguistic activity a…---
[^5]: Most explicitly in "Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology" (forthcoming),
but this theme of Dennett's goes all the way back to his "Intentional Systems,"
this JOURNAL, LXVIII, 4 (Feb. 25, 1971): 87–106; reprinted in his Brainstorm…
Joseph Margolis
philosopher · 3 mentions across 2 readings
In this course
Margolis appears as a property dualist who argues that the normative character of mental and linguistic activity resists physicalist reduction or elimination. His work is cited alongside Dennett's in a discussion of intentionality and whether mental phenomena can be fully captured by mechanical or computational systems—a central concern for theories of AI and machine consciousness in the seminar. He functions primarily as a passing reference anchoring debates about the limits of computational explanation.
Mentioned in 2 readings
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