Some information spaces may remain inaccessible not just in practice but also in principle, or they may be accessible only asymmetrically, to some agents. Not only that, but given the variety of agents, what is accessible to one, or some, m…Hughes, P., & Brecht, G. (1976). Vicious circles and infinity: A panoply of paradoxes. London: Cape. Originally published: Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975.
Kant, I. (1998). Critique of pure reason repr. w. corr. (trans: Guyer, P., & Woo…
Thomas Nagel
philosopher · 3 mentions across 2 readings
In this course
Nagel's philosophical work on subjective experience and the "hard problem" of consciousness—particularly his essay "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?"—provides critical grounding for questions about incommensurable perspectives and the limits of objective knowledge that structure discussions of AI consciousness and machine epistemology. His framework appears in the readings to contextualize asymmetries in information access across different kinds of agents (human, machine, animal), challenging the assumption that all knowers have equal access to the same epistemic spaces. This makes Nagel essential for thinking through whether machine learning systems might operate in fundamentally alien phenomenological registers that resist human comprehension.
Mentioned in 2 readings
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Immanuel Kant 2Allen Newell 1Allen W. Wood 1David Marr 1Dennis Macko 1George Brecht 1Grover Maxwell 1Herbert Feigl 1Hilary Putnam 1J. A. Scott Kelso 1Jancis Robinson 1Michael Scriven 1Mihajlo D. Mesarovic 1Patrick Hughes 1Paul Guyer 1Paul Oppenheim 1Roberto Poli 1Ron McClamrock 1Yasuhiko Takahara 1Zenon W. Pylyshyn 1