Some information spaces may remain inaccessible not just in practice but also in principle, or they may be accessible only asymmetrically, to some agents. Not only that, but given the variety of agents, what is accessible to one, or some, m…Hughes, P., & Brecht, G. (1976). Vicious circles and infinity: A panoply of paradoxes. London: Cape. Originally published: Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975.
Kant, I. (1998). Critique of pure reason repr. w. corr. (trans: Guyer, P., & Woo…
Thomas Nagel
philosopher · 3 mentions across 2 readings
In this course
Thomas Nagel is a philosopher of mind best known for his work on consciousness and subjective experience, particularly the problem of "what it is like" to be a conscious creature. In this course's framework examining AI and machine perception, Nagel's thinking enables a critical argument about epistemological limits: the readings invoke him to establish that certain information spaces may be fundamentally inaccessible across different types of agents, challenging assumptions that consciousness or knowledge can be universally shared or computed. His work helps ground the seminar's inquiry into whether AI systems can bridge subjective experiential gaps or whether some forms of understanding remain asymmetrically distributed by the nature of embodied or artificial perception itself.
Mentioned in 2 readings
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Immanuel Kant 2Allen Newell 1Allen W. Wood 1David Marr 1Dennis Macko 1George Brecht 1Grover Maxwell 1Herbert Feigl 1Hilary Putnam 1J. A. Scott Kelso 1Jancis Robinson 1Michael Scriven 1Mihajlo D. Mesarovic 1Patrick Hughes 1Paul Guyer 1Paul Oppenheim 1Roberto Poli 1Ron McClamrock 1Yasuhiko Takahara 1Zenon W. Pylyshyn 1