The difficulty with any nonformal reductio is that the conclusion against the initial assumption is always no better than the material assumptions invoked to reach the incoherent conclusion. In this case the additional assumptions involve a…[^]: An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the University of Ottawa, and to the Brain, Mind, and Person colloquium at SUNY/Oswego. My thanks for the suggestions and criticisms that have informed the present version.
[^1]: See Pau…
Patricia Churchland
philosopher · 2 mentions across 1 reading
In this course
Patricia Churchland is a neurophilosopher known for defending materialism and the biological basis of mind against dualist and internalist theories of meaning. The course readings invoke her work to challenge assumptions about consciousness and representation that underpin debates over whether minds can be reduced to physical processes—a foundational question for understanding how AI systems might relate to cognition and intentionality. Her critique of non-formal arguments and theory-laden assumptions appears to ground the course's skepticism toward philosophical frameworks that treat mental states as fundamentally separate from neural substrates.
Mentioned in 1 reading
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