The difficulty with any nonformal reductio is that the conclusion against the initial assumption is always no better than the material assumptions invoked to reach the incoherent conclusion. In this case the additional assumptions involve a…[^]: An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the University of Ottawa, and to the Brain, Mind, and Person colloquium at SUNY/Oswego. My thanks for the suggestions and criticisms that have informed the present version.
[^1]: See Pau…
Patricia Churchland
philosopher · 3 mentions across 2 readings
In this course
Patricia Churchland is a neurophilosopher known for naturalistic approaches to mind and consciousness that reject Cartesian dualism in favor of materialism grounded in neuroscience. She appears in the course readings in the context of debates over meaning, reduction, and the relationship between neural processes and cognition—specifically where arguments about the formal properties of systems bump against questions of what makes thought or agency "real." Her work enables discussions of how computational and mechanistic accounts of mind relate to claims about human agency, particularly relevant when the readings examine whether game systems, algorithms, and networked technologies constitute genuine cognitive or social phenomena.
Mentioned in 2 readings
Appears alongside
People mentioned in the same passages — sorted by co-occurrence weight.
Alex Quicho 1Bernard Suits 1C. Thi Nguyen 1Christopher Hadnagy 1David Chalmers 1Donald Hoffman 1Fred Otash 1Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 1Howard Hughes 1Kanzi 1Marilyn Monroe 1Mindy Seu 1Paul Churchland 1Paul Samuelson 1Reza Negarestani 1Robert Brandom 1Wilfrid Sellars 1Jerry Fodor 1Joseph E. LeDoux 1Michael S. Gazzaniga 1Paul Feyerabend 1Richard Gregory 1Richard Rorty 1